Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 33
Issue 1 Summer 2002
2001

The Free Exercise Clause: How Redundant, and
Why?
Daniel O. Conkle
Indiana University-Bloomington

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the First Amendment Commons
Recommended Citation
Daniel O. Conkle, The Free Exercise Clause: How Redundant, and Why?, 33 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 95 (2002).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol33/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Article 5

The Free Exercise Clause:
How Redundant, and Why?*
Daniel 0. Conkle**
Professor Mark Tushnet argues that as a matter of contemporary
constitutional doctrine, the Free Exercise Clause may be redundant.'
Tushnet notes that the Clause has a limited reach as a result of the
peyote case, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith,2 and he contends that most of the protection that it continues to
afford is independently provided by other First Amendment
doctrines-those protecting freedom of speech and freedom of
expressive association. 3 In this article, I will address a series of
questions concerning the issue of redundancy. In so doing, I will offer
my own analysis of some of the doctrinal terrain that Tushnet maps.
My specific conclusions will not be identical to Tushnet's, but my
analysis will complement his, and it will support the general thrust
of
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** Robert H. McKinney Professor of Law, Nelson Poynter Senior Scholar, and Adjunct

Professor of Religious Studies, Indiana University-Bloomington. This article is based upon a
paper that I presented on February 3, 2001, at a Conference on Law and Religion at the Loyola
University Chicago School of Law. It was an outstanding conference, and I wish to thank the
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal for inviting me to participate. For comments and
suggestions concerning my paper, I am grateful to Professor Michael J. Perry and to my fellow
conference participants, including especially Professors Kent Greenawalt and Eugene Volokh.
1. Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 71 (2001).
2. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
3. Tushnet, supra note 1. Tushnet's argument is primarily doctrinal and descriptive. For a
normative argument generally supporting the sort of redundancy that Tushnet identifies, see
William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN.
L. REV. 545 (1983).
4. My focus, like Tushnet's, is on the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. I do not
address the potential significance of analogous state constitutional provisions, nor do I consider
the impact of religious liberty legislation, such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994), the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (West Supp. 2001), or
comparable state legislation. For a helpful summary and discussion of these potential sources of
religious liberty, see Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, 40 CATH.
LAW. 25, 38-46 (2000). See also Symposium, Restoring Religious Freedom in the States, 32
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In Part I, the most extensive section, I will discuss the core meaning
of the contemporary Free Exercise Clause-the nondiscrimination
requirement of Smith-and how it might be subsumed within the free
speech principle that disfavors content discrimination. I then will
address arguments that the Free Exercise Clause has additional, and
potentially non-redundant meaning, moving step by step beyond the
core principle of Smith. Thus, in Part II, I will discuss the argument that
Smith does not merely forbid purposeful discrimination, but rather
imposes a broader and more robust requirement of "general
applicability." Moving a step further, Part III will review the protection
that the Clause might provide even from nondiscriminatory and
generally applicable laws. Next, in Part IV, I will highlight how the
Free Exercise Clause, even when it does no independent doctrinal work,
has doctrinal significance insofar as it informs the particular substance
of the Supreme Court's other First Amendment doctrines. Finally, in
Part V, I will conclude by emphasizing the extent to which the Court's
various doctrines, despite their overlapping content, now leave the
exercise of religion unprotected. I also will suggest an explanation for
the Court's limited protection of religious exercise as such and for the
migration of religious freedom claims to other doctrinal rubrics.
I. DOES

EVERY VIOLATION OF SMITH'S NONDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE

ALSO VIOLATE FREEDOM OF SPEECH?

The general rule of Smith is that the Free Exercise Clause provides
protection if the challenged governmental action not only burdens
religious exercise, but burdens it through a law or regulatory action that
discriminates on the basis of religion. 5 By discrimination, I mean
purposeful discrimination, that is, the government's formal, or
otherwise deliberate, use of religion as a criterion of selection. I am not
presupposing any further or particular sort of underlying governmental
motivation. 6 For example, if the government were to ban the religious
use of peyote, but not the nonreligious use of this drug, that would
constitute purposeful discrimination, and the underlying reasons or

U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 513 (1999); Symposium, State and FederalReligious Liberty Legislation: Is
It Necessary? Is It Constitutional?Is It Good Policy?, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 415 (1999).
5. Smith, 494 U.S. 872.
6. The concept of purposeful discrimination based on religion is closely analogous to the
concept of purposeful discrimination based on race, which is presumptively forbidden by the
Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
In Smith, the Court itself invoked this analogy, citing Washington v. Davis as a relevant
precedent. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3.
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motivations for the discrimination would not affect this conclusion.
Under Smith, religion-based discrimination, in furtherance of the
imposition of governmental burdens on religious exercise, is
(presumptively, but almost always) unconstitutional. 7
The
discriminatory denial of broadly available governmental benefits might
fairly be described as a burden. If so, such a discriminatory action
would likewise fall prey to the nondiscrimination principle of Smith and
8
therefore lead to invalidation under the Free Exercise Clause.
As Professor Tushnet argues, however, religious exercise often takes
the form of speech. And speech, including religious speech, is
independently protected from the imposition of purposefully
discriminatory burdens-that is, from burdens that formally or
deliberately discriminate on the basis of content. When religious speech
is at stake, governmentally imposed burdens that violate the
nondiscrimination principle of Smith thus are likely also to violate the
free speech principle that (presumptively, but almost always) prohibits
discrimination on the basis of content. Tushnet argues that much
religious exercise, even if not pure speech, may properly be regarded as
symbolic speech-that is, as conduct that is intended to be
communicative and that, in context, is likely to be perceived as such by
a reasonable observer. 9 Tushnet contends that when the government is
regulating pure or symbolic religious speech in a manner that violates
the nondiscrimination principle of Smith, it generally will also be
engaged in content-based discrimination that independently violates
freedom of speech.'°
7. In Smith, the Court suggested that it would be unconstitutional "to ban ... acts or
abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious
belief that they display." Smith, 494 U.S. at 877. The Court elaborated in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). In Lukumi, the Court stated that
discriminatory burdens on the exercise of religion "must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny."
Id. at 546. The Court noted that a "compelling governmental interest" and a "narrowly tailored"
law conceivably might justify such discrimination, albeit "only in rare cases." Id. at 531-32, 546.
In reality, it is hard to imagine how the government could ever make the required showing. Cf.
id. at 546-47 ("Where government restricts only conduct protected by the First Amendment and
fails to enact feasible measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial harm or alleged
harm of the same sort, the interest given in justification of the restriction is not compelling.").
8. Based on arguments along these lines, some have concluded that the inclusion of religious
schools and organizations in general funding programs, including voucher programs, is not only
permitted by the Establishment Clause, but also required by the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Religion in the United States: Fin de Sikcle Sketches, 75 IND. L.J.
295, 321-26 (2000); Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICs & PUB. POL'Y 341 (1999).
9. This two-part test for symbolic speech derives from Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,
410-11 (1974). See also Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293-94 (1984).
10. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 73-84.
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Citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul" and noting the Supreme Court's
special hostility to discrimination based not merely on content but on
viewpoint, Tushnet also suggests that even non-speech conduct might
receive free speech protection if it is being regulated precisely because
of its religious nature. 12 I agree that free speech doctrine should be
understood to prevent discrimination against religious conduct even
when the conduct, if analyzed independently, might not appear to
qualify as pure or symbolic speech. Indeed, I cannot imagine a case in
which a violation of the nondiscrimination principle of Smith could not
properly be conceptualized as a discriminatory targeting of religious
content in violation of free speech. This stark conclusion may be more
categorical than Tushnet's, and my analysis, although sympathetic to
his, takes a somewhat different path. An elaboration therefore may be
instructive, if only to confirm and reinforce the position that Tushnet
has advanced.
The Supreme Court's free speech doctrine draws a sharp distinction
13
between content-based and content-neutral governmental action.
Content-based regulation is generally unconstitutional. As Professor
Tushnet explains, content-based regulation may be upheld if the
regulated content falls within a special category of speech, such as
obscenity, "fighting words," or commercial speech, categories that
receive less than full constitutional protection. 14 In addition, the
government can make certain content-based decisions in denying
private speakers access to some types of governmental property or
resources-in particular, to so-called "nonpublic forums," which are
available to some private speakers but which are "not by tradition or
designation" more general "forum[s] for public communication." 15
Even in the context of a nonpublic forum, however, the government
cannot engage in discrimination based on viewpoint, a form of content-

11. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
12. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 76-78.
13. Thus, with various modifications and complications, the Court continues to apply a variant
of the two-track analysis described by Professor John Hart Ely in his perceptive interpretation of
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case
Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1482, 1483-84, 1496-1502 (1975).
14. See Tushnet, supra note 1,at 74, 78-79.
15. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); see also
id. at 49 ("Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions in
access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity."); cf id. at 45-46 & n.7 (suggesting
that the government, outside the context of traditional public forums, is free to create designated
public forums and that these designated public forums can be "limited" public forums that restrict
access on the basis of subject matter or speaker identity).
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based decision making that is especially offensive to free speech
values. 16 Outside of the exceptional situations, content-based laws are
invalid unless the government can meet an almost insurmountable test
of strict judicial scrutiny. 17 And the same test applies to viewpoint
discrimination in a nonpublic forum. 18 Content-neutral laws, by
contrast, even when they impair fully protected speech, generally are
tested by a considerably less rigorous, ad hoc balancing test, a test that
the government frequently can satisfy. 19 The content-based versus
content-neutral dichotomy extends to symbolic as well as pure speech.
For example, prohibitions on flag desecration-symbolic speech-have
been invalidated as content-based, 20 whereas content-neutral restrictions
on billboards-pure speech-are much more likely to be upheld.2 '

16. See id. at 46. When the government itself is the dominant "speaker," there may not even
be a nonpublic forum for private expression, and the government may have considerable freedom
in selecting the viewpoints that it chooses to promote. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n
v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 672-75 (1998) (suggesting that a public television or radio station, in
general, is not even a nonpublic forum and that most of its editorial judgments are not subject to
the usual First Amendment prohibition on viewpoint discrimination).
17. "Whether applying an 'absolute protection' approach, a 'clear and present danger' test, a
'compelling governmental interest' standard, or some other formulation, the Court almost
invariably reaches the same result-content-based restrictions of 'high-value' speech are
unconstitutional." Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 48
(1987).
18. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; id. at 55-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that viewpoint
discrimination was present in the case at hand and calling for invalidation of the challenged
policy under a test of strict judicial scrutiny); id. at 48-49 & n.9 (majority opinion) (denying that
viewpoint discrimination was present, but suggesting that if it were, it would be "forbidden" and
would be "barred by the First Amendment"); cf Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund,
473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) ("[Tlhe government violates the First Amendment when it denies
access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses.").
19. Although the Court's review of content-neutral laws tends to be deferential, it is
sometimes more searching, especially for laws that significantly or severely restrict the
opportunity for expression. As Professor Geoffrey R. Stone has observed, "the general pattern is
clear: as the restrictive effect increases, the standard of review increases as well." Stone, supra
note 17, at 59.
20. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989).
21. In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), seven justices suggested
that the First Amendment would not preclude a content-neutral prohibition on billboards. See id.
at 507-08 (plurality opinion, expressing the view of four justices); id. at 552-53 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting in part); id. at 559-61 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
In Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, the Supreme Court noted and reaffirmed
this position, declaring that "esthetic interests" are "sufficiently substantial to provide an
acceptable justification for a content-neutral prohibition against the use of billboards." Members
of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806-07 (1984). But cf City of Ladue v.
Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (invalidating a ban on residential signs even on the assumption that
the ban was content-neutral).
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A regulation is properly regarded as content-based if it targets
conduct-verbal or nonverbal-that is deemed harmful because it sends
a message and because of the particular message that it sends. Thus,
such a regulation targets the expressive or communicative component of
the regulated conduct. By contrast, a regulation is content-neutral if it
targets conduct that is deemed harmful apart from any message that it
sends, that is, apart from any expressive or communicative element that
22
it contains.
A regulation that is content-neutral might not implicate freedom of
speech at all. Free speech protection ordinarily does not arise unless the
conduct that draws the legal remedy has "a significant expressive
element. '' 23 When a content-neutral law is at issue, challengers can
meet this condition only through an affirmative showing that their
conduct is pure or symbolic speech.24
A ban on public nudity, for instance, may properly be regarded as
content-neutral. Thus, the law might be targeting public nudity because
the public nudity is deemed harmful to societal order and morality, apart
25
from any message that a public nudist might be attempting to convey.
Application of the law might trigger the limited protection available
under the content-neutral balancing test, but it will trigger no free
speech review at all unless the nudist first can demonstrate that his or
her nudity was symbolic speech within the scope of the First
Amendment. Such a showing might be difficult to make, because the
nudist would have to show that he or she actually intended to
communicate a particular message simply by appearing nude and that a
reasonable observer would understand that such a message was being
sent. 26 A nude sunbather, for example, would be hard-pressed to prevail
under this analysis. And even if some nudists, say nude dancers, could
prove that their nudity amounted to symbolic speech, the regulation

22.

Professor Ely has explained the distinction as follows:
The critical question would therefore seem to be whether the harm that the state is
seeking to avert is one that grows out of the fact that the defendant is communicating,
and more particularly out of the way people can be expected to react to his message, or
rather would arise even if the defendant's conduct had no communicative significance
whatever.
Ely, supra note 13, at 1497.
23. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706 (1986).
24. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n.5 (1984).
25. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567-71 (1991) (plurality opinion); cf City
of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289-96 (2000) (plurality opinion) (following Barnes in
finding a nudity ban content-neutral, but relying in part on a "secondary effects" analysis).
26. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974); see also Clark, 468 U.S. at 293-
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27
could nonetheless be justified under the content-neutral balancing test.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's review is quite deferential in a context
such as this, when a general prohibition of conduct has the incidental
effect of restricting symbolic speech.28
The same reasoning extends to a content-neutral regulation affecting
religious exercise: such a regulation might not implicate freedom of
speech at all, and even if it did, the content-neutral balancing test
probably would permit the regulation nonetheless. Consider Smith,2 9
for example, through the lens of freedom of speech. The criminal law
there at issue was a general prohibition on the possession and use of
peyote. 30 The harm the law was designed to avert clearly was unrelated
to any message that the religious (or other) possession or use of peyote
might convey. The law, therefore, was content-neutral. As Professor
Tushnet suggests, the sacramental taking of peyote arguably could
qualify as symbolic speech, 3 1 although that would require an adequate
showing by the participants concerning their intent to communicate and
the communicative effect of their behavior. 32 In any event, free speech
almost certainly would provide no protection, because the balancing test
could easily be satisfied.3 3

27. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 565-72 (plurality opinion); see also Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 296302 (plurality opinion).
28. In this respect, the plurality opinions in Barnes and Pap's A.M. are exemplary. Barnes,
501 U.S. at 565-72 (plurality opinion); Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 296-302 (plurality opinion); see
also Clark, 468 U.S. at 293-99 (upholding a National Park Service prohibition on sleeping as
applied to homeless demonstrators who claimed the right to sleep as an act of symbolic
expression); see generally Stone, supra note 17, at 50-52, 70-71 (discussing deferential contentneutral review and its application in symbolic expression cases). Justices Scalia and Thomas
have urged an even more deferential approach in this context; indeed, they would conduct no
First Amendment review at all when a general prohibition of conduct has the incidental effect of
restricting symbolic speech. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 572-81 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment); see also Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 307-10 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment).
29. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
30. Id. at 874.
31. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 75-77.
32. In Smith itself, the Supreme Court asserted, without analysis, that the free exercise claim
was "unconnected with any communicative activity." Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
33. One could argue otherwise. In particular, one could argue that the symbolic speakers,
because of their distinctive religious beliefs, could not realistically communicate their particular
message in any other way, making the content-neutral law sufficiently restrictive of free speech as
to trigger serious judicial scrutiny and potential invalidation. But this argument, if accepted,
would appear to give symbolic religious speech unique protection from general conduct
regulations and, indeed, it could be seen to undermine Smith itself. It seems doubtful that the
Court would move in this direction. See generally Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normalized Free
Exercise Clause: Three Abnormalities, 75 IND. L.J. 77, 93 (2000) (discussing the free speech
balancing test; arguing that doctrinal consistency would demand a similar test for religious
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By contrast, a regulation that is content-based, by definition, targets
content; that is, it targets an expressive or communicative aspect of
conduct.
As such, it almost invariably-and almost by
definition-implicates freedom of speech by regulating "conduct with a
significant expressive element." 34 Because it is content-based,
moreover, it is almost always invalid under governing free speech
doctrine. Thus, the Supreme Court has stated that the government
cannot "proscribe particular conduct because it has expressive
elements" 35 and cannot "target conduct on the basis of its expressive
36
content."
A ban on the desecration of the American flag, for example, is
inexplicable except as a law designed to protect the American flag as a
symbol. It does not target conduct that is harmful apart from any
message that the conduct sends. Instead, it targets a harm that flows
precisely from the expressive or communicative component of the act.
In other words, it regulates an expressive element of conduct and
regulates that element because of its expressive content. As a result, the
law not only implicates freedom of speech, but also is content-based
and invalid.3 7
There is no need for the challenger to show,
independently, that the conduct being regulated is expressive conduct
within the ambit of the First Amendment. By adopting a law that
38
targets content, the government has effectively conceded the point.
In reality, the matter is not quite this simple. A law can target content
in a certain sense without implicating freedom of speech. In particular,
a law can target the content of a person's motivation when that
motivation is linked to the commission of a wrongful, non-speech act,
exercise as such; and contending that such a test often would lead to invalidation because
"alternative means of engaging in religious worship and otherwise satisfying religious obligations
are frequently not available when the government incidentally burdens religious exercise").
34. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706 (1986).
35. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (emphasis added); see id. ("'A law directed at
the communicative nature of conduct must, like a law directed at speech itself, be justified by the
substantial showing of need that the First Amendment requires."') (quoting Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), rev'd sub nom.
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984)).
36. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992).
37. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Johnson, 491 U.S. 397.
38. In Texas v. Johnson, before turning to the question of whether the law was content-based
or content-neutral, the Supreme Court first discussed the issue of symbolic speech and had "little
difficulty" concluding that the defendant's flag-burning satisfied the two-part test of Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974). Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405-06; see also id. at 402-06.
If my analysis is correct, the Court could have avoided this independent discussion of symbolic
speech, given its subsequent conclusion that the law, at least as applied, targeted the expressive
content of the defendant's conduct. See id. at 406-10.
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and when the motivation makes the act especially harmful. This is the
theory of Wisconsin v. Mitchell,39 which permits the government to
enhance the punishment for a violent crime when the criminal has
selected his victim on an invidious basis, such as race. 40 The same
theory supports employment discrimination laws that forbid wrongful
employment actions-arbitrary firings, for example-if but only if they
are based on racial or similar grounds. 4 1 A state can punish bad
thoughts-bad content-in this particular context, because the state's
primary objective is the regulation of non-speech conduct that is
otherwise wrongful. 42 But even when the state is addressing nonspeech conduct, it cannot punish bad thoughts-bad content-not
directly linked to the otherwise wrongful act. A defendant's racism,43for
example, does not justify increased punishment for a nonracial crime.
As I have noted, a free speech analysis would not suggest a different
result in Smith, because the ban on peyote would be regarded as
content-neutral. Now imagine a law that banned the use of peyote if but
only if the use was religious.
This law would violate the
nondiscrimination principle of Smith and therefore would violate the
Free Exercise Clause. Would it also violate free speech? The law
discriminates on the basis of religion, a concept that is inherently linked
to the substance of ideas and therefore to content. And the harm the
government seeks to avert necessarily flows from the religious content
of the act. This case is not governed by Mitchell because the
government is not using the content of thoughts or motivations as the
basis for regulating an otherwise wrongful, non-speech act. The
hypothetical law does not regard the use of peyote as harmful. It is only
the religious use that is prohibited, and, unlike in the context of
employment discrimination, there is no competing policy-such as
employer freedom-that might rationally explain the law's failure to
regulate the non-religious use of the drug. From the standpoint of

39. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
40. See id. at 487-88 ("[T]he statute in this case is aimed at conduct unprotected by the First
Amendment ... [and] singles out for enhancement bias-inspired conduct because this conduct is
thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm.").
41. As the Court noted in Mitchell, "motive plays the same role under the [penaltyenhancement] statute as it does under federal and state antidiscrimination laws." Id. at 487.
42. Professor Tushnet suggests that employment discrimination might sometimes be protected
by the First Amendment, as a matter of expressive association. See Tushnet, supra note I, at 8486. That issue, however, is distinct from the free speech question I am addressing in the text.
The question I am addressing is whether a prohibition on employment discrimination, by
targeting content, implicates the First Amendment without regard to any claim of expressive
association.
43. See Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992).
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freedom of speech, the law is no different than a law banning the use of
peyote if but only if the user had a political motivation or if but only if
the act occurred in a political context. 44 Unlike in Mitchell or in the
employment discrimination context, it is impossible to maintain that the
state's primary objective is the regulation of non-speech conduct that is
otherwise regarded as wrongful. From all that appears, the act itself is
not deemed harmful apart from the content of the ideas with which it is
linked.
It seems undeniable that the hypothetical peyote law sees harm not in
the use of peyote as such, but in the message or the ideas that are
associated with its religious use. The law regulates an expressive
element of conduct and regulates that element precisely because of its
expressive content. As a result, there is no need for a free speech
challenger to show, independently, that the religious behavior is
expressive conduct within the ambit of the First Amendment. The
government has conceded as much by adopting a regulation that is
otherwise irrational and, indeed, inexplicable. As a content-based
regulation, the law is an invalid restriction on free speech. It is also
invalid under the Free Exercise Clause, but that invalidity is redundant.
Consider the real-life example of Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah.45 In Lukumi, the Supreme Court confronted city
ordinances that targeted the religious practice of animal sacrifice by
Santerfa practitioners; the ordinances did not reach non-religious
practices causing the same or similar harms. 46 The Court correctly
concluded that the ordinances violated the nondiscrimination principle
of Smith.4 7 It could also have concluded, however, that the law was a
content-based violation of free speech. The city might have argued
Mitchell, claiming that the killing of animals is non-speech conduct that
is generally wrongful, and that, following the model of employment
discrimination laws, the city chose not to ban the killing more
comprehensively because of a competing policy favoring human liberty.
This argument is tenuous. It seems apparent that the city's primary
44. Cf James Weinstein, Hate Crime and Punishment:A Comment on Wisconsin v. Mitchell,
73 OR. L. REv. 345, 361 (1994) ("Although no Supreme Court case is precisely on point, [the
First Amendment's] mandate of political neutrality should extend even to regulation of criminal
activity that is neither speech nor expressive conduct.").
45. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
46. See id. at 531-40, 542-46. The ordinances were drawn in such a manner that they also
exempted kosher slaughter, effecting a type of "religious gerrymander." See id. at 535-37.
47. See id. at 542 (concluding that the ordinances "had as their object the suppression of
religion" and that they "target[ed]" Santerfa religious exercise); id. at 545 (concluding that each
of the ordinances "pursues the city's governmental interests only against conduct motivated by
religious belief").
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purpose, at least, was not to address the harm of the non-speech conduct
at all, but was rather to address a harm that was deemed to flow from
the religious content of Santerfa sacrifice. If so, then freedom of speech
is implicated without the need for an independent showing that Santerfa
sacrifice is symbolic speech. Again, the government has effectively
conceded that it is regulating expressive conduct by adopting a law that
is otherwise irrational and inexplicable. The law is invalid as a matter
48
of free speech as well as free exercise.
What about governmental discrimination against religion not in the
form of direct regulatory action, but rather in the denial of otherwise
available governmental benefits, such as access to nonpublic forums or
to other public property, resources, or programs? Suppose, for example,
that a public university creates a "student activities" fund for student
groups, but denies access to the fund for "religious activities." 49 The
discriminatory denial of such a benefit could be seen as a discriminatory
burden on religious exercise and therefore a violation of the
nondiscrimination principle of Smith. 50 As before, however, the
discrimination would likewise appear to violate free speech. The
48. In the context of lower value, sexually explicit speech, the Supreme Court sometimes has
upheld laws that appear to be content-based on the theory that the laws, despite their appearance,
are actually directed not to content as such, but only to the "secondary effects" that happen to be
associated with that content. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41
(1986). To date, the Supreme Court has not relied upon this theory outside the context of lower
value speech. Cf. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52-53 & n.ll (1994) (avoiding a
secondary effects argument concerning the potential visual clutter of residential political signs, as
opposed to other, unregulated signs, by concluding that the sign regulation at issue was invalid
even under a content-neutral analysis). In any event, the secondary effects theory cannot justify
the selective regulation at issue in Lukumi, nor can it justify the hypothetical peyote regulation
discussed earlier. As discussed in the text, there simply are no harmful effects that are especially
associated with the religious activities that are targeted-that is, no harmful effects apart from the
content of the religious ideas with which the activities are linked.
The secondary effects theory might be more plausible in other contexts, such as religion-based
zoning or land use regulations, but this would require a problematic extension of the theory to
speech that is not lower value. If the theory were nonetheless extended to allow discrimination
against religion as a matter of free speech doctrine, then, to that extent, the Free Exercise Clause
might provide non-redundant constitutional protection. But this would be so, of course, only if
the Supreme Court, in interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, did not engraft a comparable,
"secondary effects" exception to the nondiscrimination principle of Smith. See generally Robert
W. Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation? Protecting Religious Land Uses After Boerne, 68 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 861, 892-913 (2000) (suggesting that the secondary effects theory might well
extend to religion-based zoning and land use regulations, but contending that even if it does, free
speech doctrine should still provide significant protection for religious uses).
49. Such a case reached the Supreme Court in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). The University of Virginia had denied funding for
the publication of a Christian magazine. Id.at 825-27. The Court found a violation of free
speech. Id. at 828-46.
50. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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discrimination is inexplicable except as governmental action that targets
content and therefore expressive conduct. As a matter of free speech
doctrine, moreover, the Supreme Court typically regards discrimination
against religious content as not merely content-based, but also
viewpoint-based, 5 1 rendering it presumptively unconstitutional even in
the setting of a nonpublic forum. To be sure, the Establishment Clause,
in certain contexts, might justify discrimination against religion in the
conferral of governmental benefits, and this might permit the
government to overcome the presumption of invalidity. 52 If so,
however, the same result would follow not only under free speech
doctrine, but also under the Free Exercise Clause. Once again, the Free
Exercise Clause would provide no distinctive constitutional protection.
Under the reasoning that I have set forth in this section, virtually
every violation of the nondiscrimination principle of Smith is also a
violation of free speech. Indeed, there may be no exceptional cases. If
this were the end of the analysis, it would seem that the Free Exercise
53
Clause is not just virtually redundant, but utterly so.
II.

DOES THE NONDISCRIMINATION DOCTRINE OF SMITH INCLUDE A
MORE ROBUST REQUIREMENT OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY?

Contemporary free exercise doctrine, as reflected in Smith54 and
Lukumi, 5 5 is designed primarily to redress discriminatory burdens on

51. See, e.g., Good News Club v, Milford Cent. Sch., 121 S. Ct. 2093, 2100-02 (2001);
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-32; Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 392-94 (1993); see generally infra Part IV (arguing that the Free Exercise Clause might
play a contributing role in this and other aspects of free speech doctrine).
52. Even in the qontext of a neutral program of benefits, for example, it might violate the
Establishment Clause for the government to make direct money payments to religious
institutions. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 842.
53. Professor Frederick Mark Gedicks argues that the nondiscrimination principle of Smith is
rendered redundant by constitutional doctrines apart from free speech--doctrines interpreting the
Equal Protection and Establishment Clauses to forbid purposeful religious discrimination. See
Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards'a Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
925, 929 (2000). Gedicks's description of the Court's doctrinal statements is accurate, but I am
not sure that these doctrines, in themselves, provide a substitute for the nondiscrimination
principle of Smith that is in fact independent of the Free Exercise Clause. In particular, I strongly
suspect that equal protection doctrine concerning religious discrimination is an implicit byproduct of the religion clauses. And if the unconstitutional religious discrimination works to
burden or disadvantage religion, surely it makes more sense to think of the constitutional
infirmity as a product of the Free Exercise Clause, not the Establishment Clause. See Church of
the Lukumi'Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (noting Establishment
Clause cases, but suggesting that the Free Exercise Clause "is dispositive" when the government
is imposing a discriminatory burden or disadvantage on religion).
54. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
55. Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520.
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religious exercise, that is, burdens that are formally. or purposefully
directed to religious practices as such. But is there more to the Court's
prevailing free exercise doctrine? Professor Douglas Laycock, among
others, contends that there is.5 6 Relying on the Court's "general
applicability" language in Smith and especially on the Court's
discussion and analysis in Lukumi, Laycock argues that prevailing free
exercise doctrine need not be construed to require a showing of
purposeful discrimination against religion.5 7 Instead, the doctrine can
be construed to mean that free exercise claimants "have to prove only
that the law is not generally applicable." 58 In Smith itself, the Supreme
Court left intact a series of cases involving unemployment
compensation, 59 which the Court explained by suggesting that they
involved "a context that lent itself to individualized governmental
assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct." 6 "[O]ur decisions
in the unemployment cases," the Court stated, "stand for the proposition
that where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it
may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship'
without compelling reason." 6 1 Laycock argues, more generally, that the
Court's free exercise doctrine can be read to protect religious exercise
from laws that regulate secular as well as religious conduct if the laws,
on their face or as applied, include secular exceptions that undermine
the government's interest in uniformity. 62

56. See Laycock, supra note 4.
57. See id. at 26-36. In Laycock's formulation, what he is contesting is an interpretation that
would require proof "that the law resulted from religious bigotry." Id. at 26; cf City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530, 535 (1997) (using the "religious bigotry" language). I formulate the
issue in terms of purposeful discrimination because I think it is clear that free exercise claimants
need not prove anything more than purposeful discrimination; in particular, they need not further
demonstrate that the purposeful discrimination was animated by "religious bigotry" or any other
specific motivation. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532 ("At a minimum, the protections of the Free
Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or
regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons."); cf Flores, 521
U.S. at 529 (indicating that Smith and Lukumi are designed to prevent "laws which are enacted
with the unconstitutional object of targeting religious beliefs and practices").
58. Laycock, supra note 4, at 26.
59. See Frazee v. I11.Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
60. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
61. Id.
62. See Laycock, supra note 4, at 26-36. An argument similar to Professor Laycock's has
been advanced and elaborated by Professor Richard F. Duncan. See Richard F. Duncan, Free
Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi, and the General Applicability
Requirement, 3 U. PA. J.CONST. L. 850 (2001); see also Laycock, supra note 4, at 26-27 n.7
(citing unpublished version of Professor Duncan's article).
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Under this interpretation, "[i]f there are exceptions for secular
interests, the religious claimant has to be treated as favorably as those
who benefit from the secular exceptions." 63 For example, if a police
department recognizes medical excuses for the wearing of beards in
violation of its facial-hair policy, it must also excuse the wearing of
beards as a matter of religious obligation. 6 4 Likewise, if a state
university exempts students from mandatory student housing for various
exempt a religious objector seeking to live in a
secular reasons, it must
65
religious group home.
As Laycock concedes, his argument raises interpretive issues of its
own. 66 Even so, his basic reading of free exercise doctrine is certainly
not implausible. He relies on the Court's own statements, and he
discusses several lower court decisions that adopt some version of this
approach.67 This interpretation may also have certain normative
attractions. It extends the reach of the Free Exercise Clause beyond
purposeful discrimination, offering constitutional protection against
laws that do not target religion, but that reflect selective indifference or
selective inattention to religious interests. 68 At the same time, a
requirement that laws apply broadly, without exception, tends to
discourage the enactment of burdensome laws, thereby69 providing
indirect political protection for religious and other minorities.
63. Laycock, supra note 4, at 35; cf Gedicks, supra note 33, at 104-19 (arguing that the
"fundamental rights" strand of equal protection-assuming that the free exercise of religion is a
fundamental right-could be construed to support this type of strong requirement of general
applicability).
64. See Laycock, supra note 4, at 32-33 (discussing Fraternal Order of Police v. City of
Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 817 (1999)).
65. See Laycock, supra note 4, at 33-34 (discussing Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540 (D.
Neb. 1996)).
66. In particular, the relevant categories or zones of regulation and exemption are not selfdefining. See Laycock, supra note 4, at 29.
67. See id. at 32-35.
68. Cf Perry, supra note 8, at 300-06 (arguing that the nondiscrimination requirement of the
Free Exercise Clause should be construed to prohibit selective indifference reflecting "diminished
respect and concern" for religious groups whose religious practices are subjected to regulation
and contending that this understanding of nondiscrimination would support a presumptive
requirement of religious exemptions); see also Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and
Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323, 343-45 (discussing an
argument similar to Perry's and suggesting that there should be constitutional redress at least for
"self-conscious indifference to the plight of religious minorities"); see generally Christopher L.
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The ConstitutionalBasis for
Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. RE V. 1245, 1285 (1994) (arguing that the
government should "treat the deep, religiously inspired concerns of minority religious believers
with the same regard"-no more and no less-"as that enjoyed by the deep concerns of citizens
generally").
69. See Laycock, supra note 4, at 35-36.
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Although Laycock's argument is plausible and potentially attractive,
I doubt that the Supreme Court's free exercise doctrine stretches as far
as Laycock suggests.
In Smith, the Court's discussion of
"individualized exemptions" was designed to preserve, and to narrowly
confine, the Court's prior holdings in the unemployment compensation
cases. 70 And in Lukumi, the Court did no more than invalidate laws
whose disparate impact on religion was so overwhelming that it
compelled an inference of purposeful discrimination, that is, the
deliberate targeting of a particular religious practice. 7 1 The Court
specifically found that "[t]he record in this case compels the conclusion
that suppression of the central element of the Santeria worship service
was the object of the ordinances." 72 Thus, as the Court later explained
in City of Boerne v. Flores,73 the fundamental teaching of Smith and
Lukumi is that governmental action violates the Free Exercise Clause
when it has "the unconstitutional object of targeting religious beliefs
74
and practices."
Even so, the Court's unemployment compensation cases themselves
remain valid, and a broader requirement of general applicability may
provide some additional free exercise protection.7 5 This zone of
contemporary free exercise doctrine-whether as narrow as I think it is
or as broad as Laycock argues-provides protection from laws that do
not target religious content. Such protection cannot readily be
explained in free speech terms and, to this extent, the Free Exercise
Clause may not be redundant.

70. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
71. For analogous cases in the context of racial discrimination, see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886), and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
72. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993). The
Court noted, more generally, that a failure to satisfy the requirement of "general applicability"
would be "a likely indication" that the government had failed to act with the constitutionally
required neutrality of purpose, see id. at 531, a requirement that forbids the government from
"discriminat[ing] against some or all religious beliefs [and from] regulat[ing] or prohibit[ing]
conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons." Id. at 532.
73. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
74. Id. at 529.
75. Cf. Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative Codification of Religious Liberty, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 565, 573 (1999) (arguing that the principle of general applicability, understood
in light of Smith's discussion of the unemployment compensation cases, supports "a hard judicial
look whenever the administration of imprecise standards operates to the detriment of faith
communities, especially those outnumbered or unpopular in the relevant locale").
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III. To WHAT EXTENT DOES THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE PROTECT
RELIGIOUS EXERCISE FROM LAWS THAT ARE NONDISCRIMINATORY AND
GENERALLY APPLICABLE?

Whatever the scope of the nondiscrimination doctrine of Smith,76
there may be some free exercise claims that lie outside the scope of that
doctrine and that remain available even against laws that are concededly
nondiscriminatory and generally applicable. In Smith itself, the Court
suggested that "hybrid" claims might remain viable-that is, claims that
implicate not only the exercise of religion, but also some other
constitutional interest. 77 Thus, the Court explained its prior decision in
Wisconsin v. Yoder 78 as a case involving a hybrid constitutional claim,
based not only on the Free Exercise Clause, but also on the
constitutional right of parents to control the education of their
children. 79 As Professor Tushnet explains, however, it is not clear how
much work the Free Exercise Clause is doing in the context of a hybrid
claim,80 and, in any event, the Free Exercise Clause is not providing
independent constitutional protection.
Professor Laycock suggests that even apart from hybrid situations,
the Free Exercise Clause continues to protect certain aspects of the
institutional autonomy of religious organizations. He states that
"[s]ecular courts cannot resolve an internal religious dispute, and
especially not a doctrinal church dispute, even in the guise of sorting out
who owns a parcel of church property." 8 1 He further contends that the
Free Exercise Clause protects religious organizations in their selection
of clergy, notwithstanding general laws forbidding employment
discrimination. 82 More generally, he argues that the Clause precludes
judicial decisions that "interfere with the allocation of religious
authority" by undermining the governance structure of religious
83
organizations.
The Court in Smith did not address the issue of institutional
autonomy as such. As Laycock notes, the Court did reaffirm that
government may not "lend its power to one or the other side in

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
See id. at 881-82.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 91-92.
Laycock, supra note 4, at 36.
See id. at 36-37.
Id. at 38.
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controversies over religious authority or dogma." 84 The Court included
this statement in support of the more general proposition that "[t]he free
exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and
profess whatever religious doctrine one desires." 85 Clearly, the
government can neither suppress nor compel the assertion of religious
beliefs, nor can it adjudicate disputes by declaring some religious
beliefs true and others erroneous. More generally, however, Smith is
decidedly ambiguous on the question of institutional autonomy.
Freedom of belief and profession, of course, are hallmarks of free
speech. Likewise, one perhaps could argue that adjudicating disputed
religious questions amounts to adjudicating the truth of competing
opinions. In certain free speech contexts, the Supreme Court has
suggested that it is not the business of courts to resolve such disputes,
because "[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false
idea." 86 Thus, even without the Free Exercise Clause, freedom of
speech protects religious belief and profession, and free speech doctrine
might conceivably be extended to forbid courts from determining
questions of religious truth. In addition, and more clearly, an
adjudication of religious truth certainly would violate the Establishment
Clause. 87 To this extent, the Free Exercise Clause is redundant; it plays
no distinctive constitutional role.
Any broader protection of institutional autonomy is a different
matter. Does the Free Exercise Clause protect the institutional
autonomy of religious organizations even when the government is
applying general laws that do not require the adjudication of religious
questions? Smith is ambiguous. It does not explicitly affirm such
protection, but neither does it reject it.
If and to the extent that the Clause does protect this more general
right of institutional autonomy, some of the same constitutional
protection may also be available elsewhere. 88 Thus, in his important
84. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877: see Laycock, supra note 4, at 36.
85. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
86. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). "However pernicious an opinion
may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas." Id. at 339-40.
87. See generally Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of
Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219, 223-25 (2000) (noting that courts, in explaining the
constitutional prohibition on adjudicating religious questions, have relied on the Establishment
Clause as well as the Free Exercise Clause).
88. I am putting aside the argument that any such protection might be attached to the
Establishment Clause. To be sure, the Establishment Clause has been construed to forbid not
only the advancement of religion, but also its inhibition, and likewise to preclude an excessive
entanglement of government with religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 33

89
and enlightening discussion of Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,
Professor Tushnet argues that a religious organization's selection of its
clergy is constitutionally protected as a matter of expressive
association. 90 Tushnet further contends that freedom of expressive
association may also extend, perhaps broadly, to other religiously
informed refusals to associate, whether on the part of organizations or
individuals. 9 1 When no element of association is at issue, however, this
independent constitutional claim is unavailing, leaving the Free
Exercise Clause as the source of any protection that remains.

IV. DOES THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE INFORM THE SUBSTANCE OF
OTHER FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINES?

Even when it does no independent doctrinal work, the Free Exercise
Clause has doctrinal significance insofar as it informs the particular
substance of the Supreme Court's other First Amendment doctrines. As
Professor Tushnet notes, the Free Exercise Clause can be seen to justify
legislative accommodations of religious exercise, accommodations that
would otherwise violate the Establishment Clause. 92 In that context, the
Free Exercise Clause is not so much promoting constitutional protection
for religion as it is permitting legislative protection that might otherwise
93
be constitutionally forbidden.
In the context of speech and expressive association, the Free Exercise
Clause may play a more affirmative role in fostering constitutional
protection for religion. In particular, it appears that religion is accorded
a preferred status in the Court's free speech doctrine, and the same may
be true for expressive association. This preferred status may be a
product of the Free Exercise Clause.

(1971); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23, 232-33 (1997). When religious
individuals or organizations are accorded special constitutional protection from governmental
regulation, however, surely it makes more sense to regard this protection as a product of the Free
Exercise Clause. It would be mere semantics to suggest that the Free Exercise Clause might be
redundant because the Court could cite the Establishment Clause-I think mistakenly-as a basis
for protecting religious exercise from improper "inhibition" or "entanglement." See generally
supra note 53 (discussing and rejecting an argument that the nondiscrimination principle of Smith
should be considered redundant because it could be grounded in the Equal Protection Clause or in
the Establishment Clause).
89. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
90. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 84-86.
91. Id. at 86-91.
92. Id. at 92-93.
93. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987) (finding that "lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion"
is a "proper purpose" under the Constitution and is not barred by the Establishment Clause).
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Although Tushnet hesitates on the point, religious speech is properly
regarded as fully protected, high-value speech under the First
Amendment, 94 subject only to the same doctrinal tests and analyses that
apply to core political speech.9 5 Indeed, in one important respect,
religious speech appears to be protected to a degree that political speech
is not. As noted earlier, the free speech principle disfavoring content
discrimination is relaxed when the government is restricting access to a
nonpublic forum. 96 In this context, the government generally is free to
discriminate based on content-that is, content in the sense of subjectmatter. Even here, however, the government cannot engage in
discrimination based on viewpoint. Discrimination against political
speech sometimes is treated as discrimination based on subject-matter,
permitting its exclusion from a nonpublic forum. 97 Discrimination
against religious speech, by contrast, is almost always treated as
viewpoint-based, precluding its exclusion from such a forum. 98 To this
94. Tushnet agrees that this might be so, but he also suggests another possibility: that religious
speech should be treated like intermediate-value, commercial speech. See Tushnet, supra note 1,
at 79.
95. In Widmar v. Vincent, for example, the Supreme Court strongly suggested that religious
speech was fully protected, high-value speech. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70
(1981). The Court held that "religious worship and discussion" are "forms of speech and
association protected by the First Amendment," id. at 269, and it invoked strict scrutiny to
invalidate a regulation based on the religious content of a group's intended speech in a public
forum. See id. at 269-76. In so doing, the Court implicitly rejected a district court ruling that had
"found religious speech entitled to less protection than other types of expression." Id. at 267.
Tushnet himself cites Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, which also contains
suggestive language. Speaking for a seven-justice majority, Justice Scalia writes that "private
religious speech, far from being a First Amendment orphan, is as fully protected under the Free
Speech Clause as secular private expression." Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette,
515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995) (citations omitted); see Tushnet, supra note I, at 73 & n. 11. In a
plurality portion of this same opinion, joined by four justices, Scalia specifically rejects the
proposition that private religious speech should be treated like intermediate-value, commercial
speech. See Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 766-67 (plurality opinion). I strongly suspect that this is
a majority view; the point that cost Scalia his majority was his categorical assertion that private
religious speech can never be restricted in a public forum in order to avoid an Establishment
Clause violation predicated on perceived governmental endorsement. See id. at 763-70 (plurality
opinion); cf. id. at 805 n. II (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The plurality incorrectly assumes that a
decision to exclude a category of speech from an inappropriate forum must rest on a judgment
about the value of that speech.").
96. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (permitting
viewpoint-neutral exclusion of political advocacy organizations from the Combined Federal
Campaign); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (upholding exclusion of
political advertising from city-owned buses).
98. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 121 S. Ct. 2093, 2098, 2100-02 (2001)
(finding impermissible viewpoint discrimination in a public school's prohibition on the use of its
facilities "for religious purposes," as applied to deny after-school access to a Christian
organization seeking to hold weekly meetings for elementary school children to sing songs, hear
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extent, religious speech is protected from discrimination even when
political speech is not.
Freedom of expressive association, like free speech itself, is linked to
the expression of ideas. Although the full meaning of Date" is quite
uncertain, this linkage suggests that expressive association should be
most strongly protected when associational decisions implicate the
expression of ideas that, as speech, lie at the heart of the First
Amendment. A purely commercial association-a trade group, for
example-might imply a commercial message but nothing more. As a
result, a First Amendment claim of expressive association might be
weak. I°° By contrast, as Dale suggests, associations that express
political, social, or moral messages are likely to be protected. 10 1 As
Professor Tushnet argues, religious organizations (and religious
individuals in certain contexts) should be accorded the same strong
level of constitutional protection. 10 2 This is because their religious
expression, no less than political, social, and moral expression, properly
10 3
ranks high in the free speech hierarchy.

Bible lessons, memorize scripture, and pray); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 824-27, 828-32 (1995) (finding impermissible viewpoint discrimination in a
public university's denial of "student activities" funding for any "religious activity," defined as
any activity that "primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an
ultimate reality," as applied to deny funding for the publication of a Christian magazine); Lamb's
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 387-88, 392-94 (1993) (finding
impermissible viewpoint discrimination in a public school district's prohibition on the use of its
facilities "for religious purposes," as applied to deny after-hours access to a religious group
seeking to show a film series promoting "Christian family values").
99. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
100. Cf id. at 657 (implying that public accommodations laws may create little tension with
the First Amendment when those laws are confined, as they were in the past, to "clearly
commercial entities"); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 632-38 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the regulation of
predominately commercial associations generally should not be precluded).
101. Cf Dale, 530 U.S. at 660 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), and
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)-cases involving political speech-as support for the
proposition that the Boy Scouts' message, however unpopular, is entitled to First Amendment
protection).
102. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 84-91.
103. Compare the Supreme Court's description of expressive association in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984):
An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the
redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State
unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also
guaranteed .... Consequently, we have long understood as implicit in the right to
engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to
associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic,
educational, religious, and cultural ends.
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One might argue that religion's preferred status in the contexts of free
speech and expressive association could be defended even apart from
the Free Exercise Clause. I am not sure how that argument would
proceed, but it would necessarily involve a claim that religious speech
and association are entitled to special constitutional protection, as
compared to other, less protected sorts of speech and association.
Whatever else it does, however, the Free Exercise Clause makes it clear
that the exercise of religion is constitutionally valuable and worthy of
special constitutional consideration. As a result, it seems a fair
inference that if religious exercise receives special protection when it
also amounts to speech or expressive association, the Free Exercise
Clause is playing a contributing role in that analysis. 10 4 In this respect,
the Clause does no independent doctrinal work, but it does do important
doctrinal work. To this extent, the Clause is not redundant.
V. WHY IS THE CONTEMPORARY FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AS
REDUNDANT AS IT IS?

The contemporary Free Exercise Clause may not be quite as
redundant as Professor Tushnet suggests. Smith's 10 5 core prohibition of
religion-based discrimination appears to be entirely redundant, but the
nondiscrimination doctrine of Smith may include a stronger requirement
of general applicability, affording a measure of distinctive free exercise
protection. In the context of nondiscriminatory, generally applicable
laws, the Free Exercise Clause does limited work, but it may provide at
least a small amount of non-redundant constitutional shelter for the
institutional autonomy of religious organizations. Whatever its
independent doctrinal role, moreover, the Free Exercise Clause can be
understood to play an important-albeit subsidiary-function by
permitting legislative accommodations of religion and by ensuring
preferred constitutional protection for religious speech and religious
association.
Id. at 622. This freedom of association, the Court continued, "plainly presupposes a freedom not
to associate." Id. at 623.
104. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 767 (1995)
(plurality opinion) (noting that it is not enough to say that religious speech is "simply as protected
by the Constitution as other forms of private speech ... when one considers that private religious
expression receives preferential treatment under the Free Exercise Clause"); see also Douglas
Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private
Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 13 (1986) ("Like political speech, religious speech is at the core
of the constitutional right to free expression. It is singled out for special constitutional protection
in the free exercise clause. The religion clause principle of neutrality toward religion reinforces
the speech clause principle of content neutrality toward speech.").
105. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Despite these qualifications, Tushnet is correct to conclude that the
contemporary Free Exercise Clause, in the wake of Smith, has very
limited doctrinal significance. It likewise is true, as Tushnet claims,
that this development has little practical consequence if other First
Amendment doctrines provide an adequate substitute. 10 6 But do they
provide an adequate substitute? More generally, do the Court's
overlapping First Amendment doctrines provide adequate protection for
the exercise of religion?
The Court's overlapping doctrines protect religious speech and other
religious conduct from religion-based discrimination, and perhaps from
more subtle inequality under laws that are not generally applicable. As
Tushnet explains, they also protect-to an extent that might be
surprising-against nondiscriminatory, generally applicable laws that
impinge the expressive association of religious individuals and
organizations. 107 Needless to say, these are important protections.
Other religious exercise, however, goes unprotected by the First
Amendment. Religious speech, whether pure or symbolic, generally is
not protected from content-neutral regulation. Symbolic speech
analysis, for example, even if extended to the sacramental taking of
peyote, would not change the result in Smith, because the regulation was
content-neutral. Likewise, religiously motivated non-speech conduct
generally is not protected from laws that are nondiscriminatory and
generally applicable. In this context, the protection of religious
association is exceptional, as is any further protection that extends to the
institutional autonomy of religious organizations. Otherwise, general
laws can be freely applied to religious conduct-no matter how strong
the religious obligation or interest and no matter how weak the
government's concern. The religious worship of individuals, their
heartfelt acts of religious conscience, the religious activities of
churches, of synagogues, and of mosques-all can fall prey to general
laws, this without any constitutional requirement of special justification
or heightened judicial scrutiny.
Whether there is adequate constitutional protection for the exercise of
religion is a matter of normative debate.
But it is clear that
contemporary constitutional doctrine affords only limited protection,
and very little of what it affords is distinctive to religion. Why is this
so? Why is the contemporary Free Exercise Clause as redundant as it

106.
107.

See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 94.
See id. at 84-91.
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is, and why are religious freedom claims being subsumed within other
First Amendment doctrines?
Elsewhere I have discussed the general doctrinal trend favoring
nondiscrimination as the governing principle of religious liberty-under
the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses alike. 10 8 This trend, of
which Smith is a prime example, is driven by various philosophical,
jurisprudential, and religious forces. It is heavily influenced, for
example, by the general emphasis on nondiscrimination in today's
constitutional and legal culture. In the constitutional arena, Brown v.
Board of Education' 9 has had a remarkable legacy, elevating the
constitutional ideal of nondiscrimination and extending it well beyond
the context of race. I° The ideal of nondiscrimination also has captured
the popular imagination, and, in the legislative arena, it has promoted
the adoption of nondiscrimination laws of all sorts."' In the particular
context of religion, the trend favoring nondiscrimination is also a
response to America's ever-increasing religious diversity, 112 the
bewildering array of potential religious freedom claims, and the
increasingly difficult problem of determining what should qualify as the
exercise of religion. 113 For the Founders, the exercise of religion was
not a difficult concept; it was the performance of duties owed to God."14
Today, by contrast, pluralism, fairness, and changing understandings of
religion might suggest that "the exercise of religion" should be defined
to include other conscientious behavior." 5 So defined, however, the
exercise of religion might be difficult to distinguish from an even more
16
capacious notion of personal autonomy. 1

108. See Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original
Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1 (2000). 1 contend that
this trend has troublesome implications for religious liberty. See id. For a competing view,
describing the Supreme Court's doctrine in similar terms but offering normative support for the
Court's position, see William P. Marshall, What Is the Matter With Equality?: An Assessment of
the Equal Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J.
193 (2000).
109. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
110. See Conkle, supra note 108, at 26-27.
111. See id. at 27-28.
112. See Stephen J. Stein, Religion/Religions in the United States: Changing Perspectives and
Prospects, 75 IND. L.J. 37, (2000).
113. See Conkle, supra note 108, at 28-32.
114. See id. at 28-29.
115. Cf Rodney K. Smith, Converting the Religious Equality Amendment into a Statute with a
Little "Conscience," 1996 BYU L. REv. 645, 675-86 (arguing for the protection of conscience,
understood as a matter of moral duty or obligation).
116. See Conkle, supra note 108, at 14-15, 30-31.
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These modern forces have placed in question what I have called the
Founders' "original theology" of religious liberty. 117 For the Founders,
the meaning of religion and its exercise was not contested; they knew
what the exercise of religion was, and they knew that it was distinct
from nonreligious activity. They also knew that the exercise of religion
was distinctly important."18 The modem forces that I have mentioned,
by contrast, are threatening to substitute a radically different
philosophy, according to which the law, including the First
Amendment, does not or cannot give special or distinctive protection to
religious obligations or choices. The resulting trend, favoring equal
treatment between religion and nonreligion, produces explicit doctrines
of nondiscrimination, such as that of Smith. It also supports the
migration of religious freedom claims to other doctrinal rubrics, where
religion can receive the same constitutional protection as nonreligious
conduct-but nothing more. "19
The forces that I have described are powerful and perhaps
insurmountable. They favor a Free Exercise Clause that is ever more
redundant. 120 But glimmers of the original theology still flicker, and the
Free Exercise Clause has not yet been robbed of all content and
significance. Perhaps the American legal culture, even today, remains
open to the possibility that religion is, as the Founders believed, both
distinct and distinctly important. 12' More to the point, perhaps it
remains open to the possibility that the exercise of religion is a concept
that can be adequately defined in our contemporary world, and that, so
defined, is worthy of special and significant constitutional protection.

117. Notably, this is a not a claim about the "original understanding" of the First Amendment
as such. See id. at 3-5.
118. See id. at 3-4.
119. Cf Steven D. Smith, Is a Coherent Theory of Religious Freedom Possible?, 15 CONST.
COMMENT. 73, 81 (1998) (suggesting that if religious liberty is merely an inherited commitment,
it might well be dissolved into other, more current constitutional values).
120. If these forces prevail, they also are likely-at least in the long-run-to undermine
attempts to protect religious liberty in other ways, for example, through state constitutional law or
through religious liberty legislation. See generally supra note 4 (noting state constitutional law
and state and federal legislation as potential sources of religious liberty).
121. For a recent article defending the "singling out" of religion for distinctive constitutional
protection, see Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1 (2000). McConnell argues that "'singling out religion' for special constitutional
protection is fully consistent with our constitutional tradition" and that, for purposes of both free
exercise and establishment, "religion raises political and constitutional issues not raised by other
institutions or ideologies." Id. at 3.
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As one who would welcome a revitalized Free Exercise Clause, 122 I am
not optimistic, but neither am I entirely without hope.

122. A revitalized Free Exercise Clause might not mean a simple reinstatement of pre-Smith
constitutional doctrine concerning religious exemptions. Professor Frederick Mark Gedicks, for
example, contends that the Free Exercise Clause should be interpreted to give substantial
protection to religious exercise as such, but not through the pre-Smith exemption doctrine. See
Gedicks, supra note 53. Instead, Gedicks argues that constitutional protection for religious
exercise should be patterned on the various doctrinal devices and analyses that are currently used
to protect free speech. See id. According to Gedicks, "religious exercise should not be protected
as speech, but rather like speech." Id. at 930.

